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Dreaming : a conceptual framework for philosophy of mind and empirical research / Jennifer Michelle Windt.

By: Windt, Jennifer Michelle, 1978- [author.]Material type: TextTextPublisher: Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England : MIT Press, [2015]Copyright date: ©2015Description: 1 online resource (xxv, 798 pages)Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780262327466; 0262327465; 0262028670; 9780262028677Subject(s): Dreams -- Philosophy | Sleep -- Research | Psychological Phenomena | Psychological Phenomena and Processes | Sleep Stages | Imagination | Cognition | Models, Biological | Psychophysiology | Sleep | Models, Theoretical | Mental Processes | Nervous System Physiological Phenomena | Psychiatry and Psychology | Investigative Techniques | Analytical, Diagnostic and Therapeutic Techniques and Equipment | Musculoskeletal and Neural Physiological Phenomena | Phenomena and Processes | Dreams | Models, Neurological | Consciousness | Sleep, REM | PSYCHOLOGY -- General | SCIENCE -- Cognitive Science | Sleep -- Research | PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General | COGNITIVE SCIENCES/GeneralGenre/Form: Electronic books. | Electronic books. | Electronic books. Additional physical formats: Print version:: Dreaming.DDC classification: 154.6/3 LOC classification: BF1078 | .W476 2015ebOnline resources: Click here to access online
Contents:
General introduction : the conceptualization problem of dreaming -- Dream skepticism, skepticism about dreaming, and the problem of dream experience -- A short introduction to empirical dream research: history, methodology, and changing theoretical conceptions -- The methodological background assumptions of scientific dream research -- Antiskepticism about dreaming and dream reporting: from default assumption to theoretical justification -- Dreaming as quasi-perceptual experience: the traditional view -- Dreaming as imaginative experience: the rival view -- Are dreams subjective experiences, I? : phenomenal selfhood and bodily experiences in dreams -- Are dreams disembodied experiences? : the role of the body and of the brain in shaping bodily experience in dreams -- Are dreams subjective experiences, II? : the phenomenology of thinking and the problem of dream belief -- Are dreams deceptive experiences? : deception, delusion, and insight -- From oneiragogia to full-fledged dreaming : the immersive-spatiotemporal-hallucination model of dreaming -- Relocating dreams on the conceptual map : consequences and perspectives for future research.
Summary: "Dreams, conceived as conscious experience or phenomenal states during sleep, offer an important contrast condition for theories of consciousness and the self. Yet, although there is a wealth of empirical research on sleep and dreaming, its potential contribution to consciousness research and philosophy of mind is largely overlooked. This might be due, in part, to a lack of conceptual clarity and an underlying disagreement about the nature of the phenomenon of dreaming itself. In Dreaming, Jennifer Windt lays the groundwork for solving this problem. She develops a conceptual framework describing not only what it means to say that dreams are conscious experiences but also how to locate dreams relative to such concepts as perception, hallucination, and imagination, as well as thinking, knowledge, belief, deception, and self-consciousness. Arguing that a conceptual framework must be not only conceptually sound but also phenomenologically plausible and carefully informed by neuroscientific research, Windt integrates her review of philosophical work on dreaming, both historical and contemporary, with a survey of the most important empirical findings. This allows her to work toward a systematic and comprehensive new theoretical understanding of dreaming informed by a critical reading of contemporary research findings. Windt's account demonstrates that a philosophical analysis of the concept of dreaming can provide an important enrichment and extension to the conceptual repertoire of discussions of consciousness and the self and raises new questions for future research"--MIT CogNet.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 675-764) and index.

General introduction : the conceptualization problem of dreaming -- Dream skepticism, skepticism about dreaming, and the problem of dream experience -- A short introduction to empirical dream research: history, methodology, and changing theoretical conceptions -- The methodological background assumptions of scientific dream research -- Antiskepticism about dreaming and dream reporting: from default assumption to theoretical justification -- Dreaming as quasi-perceptual experience: the traditional view -- Dreaming as imaginative experience: the rival view -- Are dreams subjective experiences, I? : phenomenal selfhood and bodily experiences in dreams -- Are dreams disembodied experiences? : the role of the body and of the brain in shaping bodily experience in dreams -- Are dreams subjective experiences, II? : the phenomenology of thinking and the problem of dream belief -- Are dreams deceptive experiences? : deception, delusion, and insight -- From oneiragogia to full-fledged dreaming : the immersive-spatiotemporal-hallucination model of dreaming -- Relocating dreams on the conceptual map : consequences and perspectives for future research.

"Dreams, conceived as conscious experience or phenomenal states during sleep, offer an important contrast condition for theories of consciousness and the self. Yet, although there is a wealth of empirical research on sleep and dreaming, its potential contribution to consciousness research and philosophy of mind is largely overlooked. This might be due, in part, to a lack of conceptual clarity and an underlying disagreement about the nature of the phenomenon of dreaming itself. In Dreaming, Jennifer Windt lays the groundwork for solving this problem. She develops a conceptual framework describing not only what it means to say that dreams are conscious experiences but also how to locate dreams relative to such concepts as perception, hallucination, and imagination, as well as thinking, knowledge, belief, deception, and self-consciousness. Arguing that a conceptual framework must be not only conceptually sound but also phenomenologically plausible and carefully informed by neuroscientific research, Windt integrates her review of philosophical work on dreaming, both historical and contemporary, with a survey of the most important empirical findings. This allows her to work toward a systematic and comprehensive new theoretical understanding of dreaming informed by a critical reading of contemporary research findings. Windt's account demonstrates that a philosophical analysis of the concept of dreaming can provide an important enrichment and extension to the conceptual repertoire of discussions of consciousness and the self and raises new questions for future research"--MIT CogNet.

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